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Abstract. Unlike any other field, the science of morality has drawn attention
from an extraordinarily diverse set of disciplines. An interdisciplinary research
program has formed in which economists, biologists, neuroscientists, psychol-
ogists, and even philosophers have been eager to provide answers to puzzling
questions raised by the existence of human morality. Models and simulations,
for a variety of reasons, have played various important roles in this endeavor.
Their use, however, has sometimes been deemed as useless, trivial and inade-
quate. The role of models in the science of morality has been vastly underap-
preciated. This omission shall be remedied here, offering a much more positive
picture on the contributions modelers made to our understanding of morality.
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1 Introduction
Since Axelrod’s (1984) famous work The Evolution of Cooperation1, economists,
biologists, neuroscientists, psychologists, and even philosophers have been eager to
provide answers to the puzzling question of why humans are not the selfish creatures
natural selection seems to demand.2 The list of major contributions is vast. Of particular
importance is Skyrms’ pioneering use of evolutionary game theory (abbreviated as
EGT) and the replicator dynamics in his books The Evolution of the Social Contract
(1996) and The Stag Hunt and the Evolution of Social Structure (2004). Further
important book-length contributions on the evolution of morality are offered by Wilson
(1975); Binmore (1994, 1998, 2005); de Waal (1996, 2006); Sober and Wilson (1998);
Joyce (2006); Alexander (2007); Nowak and Highfield (2011); Bowles and Gintis
(2011); Boehm (2012), and most recently Churchland (2019).
The efforts of these and many other authors have led to the formation of an
interdisciplinary research program with the explicit aim to explain and understand
human morality, taking the first steps towards a genuine science of morality. Let us call
this research program the Explaining Morality Program (EMP). For a variety of
reasons, models, such as those provided by Skyrms, have played a very important role
in this endeavor, the most illustrative reason being the simple fact that behavior does
not fossilize. Models and simulations alone, however, have been doubted by many to
1 Based on an earlier co-authored paper with Axelrod and Hamilton (1981) of the same name.
2 See Dawkins’ (1976) book The Selfish Gene for an elegant illustration of the problem.
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provide much of an explanation when it comes to human morality. The work of
modelers in the EMP has been underappreciated for a number of reasons that can
roughly be grouped together in virtue of the following three concerns: (i) the com-
plexity of the phenomenon, (ii) the lack of empirical support, and perhaps the most
threatening criticism being (iii) the supposedly non-reducible normative dimension
morality embodies.3 In this paper, I shall argue that this underappreciation is a
mistake.4
Though interdisciplinarity has played a crucial role in the advancement of our
moral understanding; it has led to an underappreciation of the role and contribution that
highly abstract and idealized models have played. Many responses to the modeling
work within the EMP are characterized by eager attempts to draw lines in the sand, i.e.
determine prescriptive norms that would limit the justified use or misuse of such
models.5 These criticisms range from sophisticated ones, perhaps the most convincing
one offered in Levy (2011) to rather naïve criticisms such as those offered in Arnold
(2008). The latter goes so far as to label such models as useless, trivial and inadequate.
In a harsh review of Arnold (2008); Zollman (2009) criticized Arnold’s arguments
against the use of models, deeming them unconvincing and exceedingly ambitious.
Modelers may very well be tempted to attack Arnold as a straw-man and conclude that
the criticism of models for the evolution can easily be debunked. However, such an
approach would ignore the more sophisticated arguments that have been offered.
For the purposes of debunking the strongest arguments against such models, any
mention of Arnold’s (2008) criticism hardly deserves mention here. Arnold is by no
means alone, however. His mistakes illustrate a shared pattern that can be found,
though in a much weaker form, across the literature. It is a sort of a priori skepticism
and perhaps dislike among philosophers and more experimentally oriented scientists,
about the role of models in science. This skepticism is one I hope to at least partially
dispose of here.6 I shall demonstrate that models for the evolution of morality are
neither too simplistic, nor do they lack empirical data to provide us with genuine
explanatory insights. Recent advances in the philosophical literature on models,
especially on model pluralism and the role of multiple models, should allow us to
recognize not only such often exaggerated limitations but also the strengths of models
3 See Rosenberg and Linquist (2005); Northcott and Alexandrova (2015); Nagel (2012) respectively
as examples for each.
4 The EMP has faced similar criticism itself, relating not only to mathematical models but towards
scientific explanations of morality at large. My goal here is only to provide a defence of the models
used in this research program. I suggest, however, that if my attempt succeeds the entire EMP
justifies its status as a genuine science of morality. Nevertheless, see FritzPatrick (2016) for a recent
overview of EMP critics and defenders alike.
5 See D’Arms (1996, 2000); D’Arms et al. (1998); Rosenberg and Linquist (2005); Nagel (2012);
Northcott and Alexandrova (2015); Arnold (2008); Kitcher (1999); Levy (2011, 2018).
6 Godfrey-Smith (2006), for instance, diagnoses a general distrust among philosophers in respect to
“resemblance relations [of models] because they are seen as vague, context-sensitive, and slippery”
(p. 733). Similarly Sugden (2009) has argued that models work by a form of induction “however
problematic [that] may be for professional logicians” (p. 19).
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in the EMP.7 The latter of which have often been underappreciated, while the former
have been overstated. This omission shall be remedied here.
In order to demonstrate a number of conceptual mistakes made in the literature, I
shall largely draw on Alexander’s (2007) book, The Structural Evolution of Morality,
offering perhaps the most extensive modeling treatment on the evolution of morality.
Building on previous work by his former supervisor, Skyrms (1996, 2004), Alexander
analyzes a large scope of exceedingly complex and arguably more realistic models, in
order to illuminate the requirements and potential threats to the emergence and spread
of moral behavior.8 He concludes that morality can be explained by a combination of
evolutionary game theory (abbreviated as EGT), together with a theory of bounded
rationality and research in psychology. In doing so, he attempts to answer two distinct
questions: (i) how could something as altruistic as human morality emerge and (ii) how
did it persist against the threat of cheaters?
For the purposes of this paper, Alexander’s (2007) book serves as a highly
attractive case study for two reasons. Firstly, Alexander’s contribution relies solely on
highly abstract and idealized models of precisely the form often criticized as too
simplistic to provide us with genuine insights for phenomena as complex as human
morality. Secondly, while economists, psychologists, biologists, neuroscientists, and
even political scientists have provided substantial contributions to the EMP, philoso-
phers have offered distinct and extremely valuable insights by drawing conceptual
distinctions.9 As both a modeler and philosopher, Alexander treads very carefully only
suggesting possible insights, his book may provide. At times, he even underestimates
his own scientific contribution, arguing that it does not tell us much, if anything,
without the supplementation of much more empirical data. One may regard such
humility as a virtue, but at times, even an unbiased reader may get the impression that
Alexander himself sees his contribution as superfluous. However, all of this humility
seems to be thrown overboard in the very end of his book, where he discusses and
suggests implications of the EMP for our understanding of morality itself, vindicating
the ‘objective status’ of morality. Nevertheless, despite giving in too much to the
criticisms of the program, Alexander avoids several pitfalls that might obscure our
understanding of the epistemic contribution such models can provide. Here I shall shed
a much more positive light on the role of models in the EMP, or as it sometimes
referred to as: the study of moral dynamics.10
The structure of this paper corresponds roughly to the three concerns raised against
the role of models in the EMP illustrated above. Firstly, in Sect. 2, I discuss
Alexander’s contribution and explore the most important question within the literature,
i.e. why model morality? In Sect. 3, I respond to concerns regarding their empirical
7 See Knuuttila (2011); Muldoon (2007); Wimsatt (2007); Weisberg (2007a, 2013); Ylikoski and
Aydinonat (2014); Lisciandra (2017); Aydinonat (2018); Grüne-Yanoff and Marchionni (2018).
8 To some extent one may treat his contribution as an extended robustness analysis of Skyrms’ prior
work. This would not do justice to Alexander’s contribution, however.
9 Joyce (2006) book The Evolution of Morality offers perhaps the most valuable contribution in this
regard.
10 See Hegselmann (2009).
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adequacy, before finally, in Sect. 4, I cast doubt on the possibility of vindicating the
objective status of moral norms via the EMP and conclude the discussion.
2 Why Model Morality?
Evolutionary explanations of morality have been of scientific interest, since at least
Darwin. Proto-Darwinian explanations, however, have been around for a long time. As
Hegselmann (2009) points out, the EMP has a long scientific tradition going back as far
as ancient Greece. Protagoras, in one of Plato’s dialogues, provides perhaps the first
scientific explanation of morality as a set of norms and enforcement agencies being an
invention of humanity to escape a Hobbesian state of nature.11 Couched in terms of a
myth, we may treat this as a mere just-so story. Much later, David Hume came aston-
ishingly close to providing a Darwinian explanation of morality himself.12 Hegselmann
and Will (2013) determine four key components to Hume’s proto Darwinian account: a
pre-societal human nature with confined generosity, the invention of artificial values to
be reinforced and internalized through approval and disapproval of others, division of
labour reaping the benefits of cooperation and trust and the “invention of central
authorities that monitor, enforce, and eventually punish behaviour” (p. 186) already
much more sophisticated but still similar to the myth of Prometheus and Epimetheus
told by Protagoras. These accounts, a mere story and myth in the case of Protagoras and
in the case of Hume an informal suggestion of a how-possibly explanation leave much to
be desired, but they were, nevertheless, the best explanations available at the time.
Luckily it didn’t take two millennia for the next advancement. Joyce (2006) in his book
The Evolution of Morality, argues that “less than a century after Hume’s death, Darwin
delivered the means for pushing the inquiry into human morality further” (p. 228) filling
out a gap Hume could only describe as nature. Charles Darwin, of course, himself
suggested that the origin of morality can be explained with his theory:
It may be well first to premise that I do not wish to maintain that any strictly social animal, if its
intellectual faculties were to become as active and as highly developed as in man, would acquire
exactly the same moral sense as ours. In the same manner as various animals have some sense
of beauty, though they admire widely different objects, so they might have a sense of right and
wrong, though led by it to follow widely different lines of conduct. If, for instance, to take an
extreme case, men were reared under precisely the same condition as hive-bees, there can
hardly be a doubt that our unmarried females would, like the worker-bees, think it a sacred duty
to kill their brothers, and mothers would strive to kill their fertile daughters; and no one would
think of interfering. Nevertheless, the bee, or any other social animal, would gain in our
supposed case, as it appears to me, some feeling of right or wrong, or a conscience. (1879,
p. 67)
This, of course, is still, ‘just’ a how-possibly explanation or as critics like to call
them a just-so story. It should be clear that from Protagoras over Hume to Darwin,
11 Plato (1961). Protagoras. In: Hamilton E, Huntington C (eds) The collected dialogues of Plato.
Princeton University Press, Princeton.
12 Hume (1998). An enquiry concerning the principles of morals (ed by Beauchamp TL). Oxford
University Press, Oxford.
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significant improvements in the explanation of morality have been made with more and
more gaps being closed. Explanations come in degrees, and this research program is
providing better and better explanations, and perhaps the best for the moment.
Unfortunately, it took a while until informal evolutionary explanations resting on the
good for the species were replaced with formal EGT models showing that the origin of
moral behavior is not much of a mystery after all. Skyrms (1996) was the first to apply
evolutionary game theory to unpack Hume’s account in a formal manner, with others
following in the creation of new models and simulations.13 These sets of models
strengthen our confidence that morality could have evolved in a way envisioned by
Hume and Darwin, providing considerable explanatory power, even though empirical
work has, hitherto, been largely left out of the picture.14 Even the work of moral
philosophers in this Humean research program has been very empirical and guided by
science trying to unpack the idea of morality being a mere artefact (see Mackie 1977;
Joyce 2001, 2006) being a case in point for the division of labor between philosophers,
modelers and empirical researchers. Modelers such as Skyrms simply continue an old
philosophical school of thought with the modern tools of science, a move that ought to
be encouraged.
Before engaging in a more detailed analysis of our case study, i.e. the models
Alexander (2007) provides, I shall take on his last chapter titled “Philosophical
reflections” where he explores the philosophical implications of his models. Though
the appearance of moral behavior in Alexander’s models is rather robust and remains
stable even in the face of defectors, more he argues needs to be said in order to draw
inferences about human morality. Quoting Philip Kitcher, Alexander (2007, p. 267)
highlights a general problem for evolutionary explanations of morality:
[I]t’s important to demonstrate that the forms of behaviour that accord with our sense of justice
and morality can originate and be maintained under natural selection. Yet we should also be
aware that the demonstration doesn’t necessarily account for the superstructure of concepts and
principles in terms of which we appraise those forms of behaviour (Kitcher 1999).
In response, Alexander introduces a distinction between “thinly” and “thickly”
conforming to morality. Though an individual’s action may conform thinly with
morality, e.g. fair sharing, the individual may fail “to hold sufficiently many of the
beliefs, intentions, preferences, and desires to warrant the application of the term [‘]-
moral[‘] to his or her action” (2007, p. 268). In contrast, thickly conforming to morality
satisfies sufficiently many of these conditions. If someone acts ‘morally’ out of purely
selfish reasons, we may not want to call such behavior moral, e.g. someone giving to the
poor in order to improve their reputation. Akin to Kant, it is the distinction between
behavior in compliance with morality or acting out of the right, i.e. moral reasons.
When evolutionary game theory models are used to simulate the emergence and
persistence of moral behavior we only observe the “frequencies and distribution of
strategies and, perhaps, other relevant properties” (Alexander 2007, p. 270). What is
lacking here is the role of psychology, perhaps even neuroscience, in the production of
such moral behavior. Even if we allow for very complex strategies, such as those
13 See Alexander (2007); Hegselmann and Will (2010, 2013).
14 See also O’Connor (forthcoming).
Modeling Morality 87
submitted to Axelrod’s (1984) computer tournament, they still allow for a purely
behavioral interpretation.
This problem lies at the core of attempts to model the evolution of morality. Critics
argue that a complete explanation for the evolution of morality requires an under-
standing of the internal psychological mechanisms that produce such moral behavior.
Alexander concedes to this criticism, suggesting to enrich these models with “non-
strategic, psychological elements” (p. 273). He grants that EGT alone is not sufficient
for an evolutionary explanation of morality, but that “together with experimental
psychology and recent work in the theory of bounded rationality […] some of the
structure and content of our moral theories” can be explained “by working in tandem”
(p. 274). This position, of course, is a much weaker one than to claim that EGT alone
could provide genuine insights into the origins of morality.
But even if, as I suggest, EGT might be sufficient to explain much of our moral
behavior, Alexander aims at more. First of all, as Kitcher suggests, evolutionary game
theory enables the important identification of behavior that maximizes long-run
expected utility or fitness. A second step then is required to explain the motivational
structures which are “actually producing this behavior in boundedly rational individ-
uals” (2007, p. 275). Here Alexander identifies two mechanisms. First, the moral
sentiments bringing about motivation to act, and secondly, moral theories instructing us
“how to act once we have been motivated to do so” (275). Therefore, Alexander
argues, it is precisely because we are boundedly rational that the “outcome produced by
acting in accordance with moral theory are such that they tend to maximize our
expected utility over the lifetime of the individual” (p. 275). Rationality requires us to
rely on heuristics, and these luckily, according to Alexander, are often moral heuristics
such as a fair split and cooperation.15
In analyzing the influence of moral heuristics on our thinking, Alexander, based on
a distinction by Sadrieh et al. (2001), discusses three separate roles that moral heuristics
play in our thinking. Firstly, moral heuristics limit our set of options, e.g. not even
considering to poison the dog of our neighbor, even though his barking may disturbs
one’s sleep. Secondly, moral heuristics guide our information search, i.e. what we need
to consider before making a judgement. Thirdly, but closely related to the second point,
moral heuristics “tell us when to terminate an information search” (p. 277). When we
find out that someone killed a human infant for fun, it is sufficient for a moral
judgement regardless of any additional information. Dennett (1996a, b) has defended a
similar position on moral judgements, calling them conversation-stoppers for otherwise
costly debates. Relatedly, Alexander makes the rather contentious claim, that though
we use moral reasoning, moral theories have their form precisely because they track
“long-run expected utility” (p. 278). The key to the evolution of morality he argues
“lies in the fact that we all face repeated interpersonal decision problems – of many
types – in socially structured environments” (p. 278), hence the structural evolution of
morality.
As “the science of morality is only in its infancy” (p. 281) there must remain some
unanswered questions in our current explanation, however and I agree here with
15 See Veit et al. (forthcoming) for an analysis of the ‘Rationale of Rationalization’.
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Alexander, this “is no reason why we should not make the attempt” (p. 282). Akin to
primates, evolution equipped us with “emotions and other cognitive machinery”
(p. 284), in order to solve interdependent decision problems, such as those arising in
the prisoner’s dilemma, the stag hunt, and the divide the cake game. Rosenberg makes
a similar argument and extends it to love, as the “solution to a strategic interaction
problem” (2011, p. 3). Analogously, the mere fact that love is an evolved response does
not have to undermine our conviction that the feelings and intentions associated with it
are not genuine or worthy of pursuit. The same may hold for morality. Emotions and
our cognitive machinery is the raw material evolution had to use in order to solve more
complex problems humans were increasingly facing, e.g. trust and the introduction of
property rights.16 With the evolution of language, this arms race in human evolution
could only gain speed. We do not know yet which of our moral attitudes are hard-wired
and which are culturally acquired, but that is obviously no reason not to ask the
question. As we shall see, many of the EGT models used by Alexander, Skyrms, and
others allow for both a cultural and biological interpretation. As cultural evolution
operates at a much higher speed; however, many modelers such as Alexander (2007)
give them a cultural interpretation.
Establishing the motivation for his models, Alexander henceforth, turns to the
evidential support for evolutionary explanations of morality, in order to turn them into
more than ‘just-so stories’, i.e. evolutionary explanations without empirical evidence.
Evolutionary explanations are often faced with the criticism of providing nothing more
than ‘just-so stories’, i.e. historical accounts without any empirical evidence in their
favour. For Charles Darwin, it was very important to collect plentiful evidence for his
theory of natural selection and biologists to this day continue to accumulate corrobo-
rating evidence. However, when biologists try to explain the occurrence of a certain
behavior or a phenotype in general, they often start by hypothesizing how the trait
could be adaptive. This research program is often criticized as a sort of Panglossian
adaptationism, i.e. assuming the adaptiveness of a trait without further evidence.17
Though Alexander only considers two experiments, (see Yaari and Bar-Hillel 1984;
Binmore et al. 1993), they are highly suggestive that our conception of fairness is
somewhat flexible and strongly correlates with the outcomes our own group receives.
Though a philosophical review of the vast literature on moral experiments should be
undertaken, it is beyond the scope and purpose of this paper, which is merely con-
cerned with attempts to model morality.18 Nevertheless, the just-so story critique has
evolved into a term of abuse used against all kinds of model-based explanations. In this
paper, I shall attempt to argue against this commonplace treatment and highlight the
wealth and diversity models can provide in the EMP.
Though brought up as a game theorist, Alexander recognizes the weakness in the
assumptions of standard rational choice theory. In order to avoid charges of unrealis-
ticness, Alexander’s models for the evolution of moral behavior make no strong
16 Here the often drawn distinction between biological and psychological altruism plays an important
role.
17 See Gould and Lewontin 1979 for their famous critique of adaptationism.
18 See Kagel and Roth (1998) for an overview of such studies in experimental economics.
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rationality assumptions; rather he uses models of bounded rationality combined with
evolutionary game theory to account for the evolution of morality. Sugden anticipated
as much in a paper on the evolutionary turn in game theory stating that the “theory of
human behaviour that underlies the evolutionary approach is fundamentally different
from that which is used in classical game theory” (2001, p. 127), with far less con-
testable rationality assumptions, though similar in their mathematical formulation. In
short: Alexander treats bounded rationality theory as descriptively superior to standard
rational choice theory.
However, with the threat of only providing so-called just-so stories, evolutionary
explanations, in general, are often dismissed by pointing to the multiplicity of evolu-
tionary accounts we could give for the appearance of a phenomenon. These objections,
however, miss the mark when they supposed to show that evolution plays no part in
explaining morality. Alexander’s former supervisor, Brian Skyrms, himself working on
the evolution of social norms makes this criticism of just-so story charges explicit:
“Why have norms of fairness not been eliminated by the process of evolution? […]
How then could norms of fairness, of the kind observed in the ultimatum game, have
evolved?” (1996, p. 28). In this section, I argue that such criticism is highlighting
something important that Sugden (2000; 2009) tries to capture in his work on model-
based explanations. Though very similar arguments have been made by Giere (1988,
1999), Godfrey-Smith (2006), Weisberg (2007b, 2013), and Levy (2011), Sugden’s
work serves as an elegant illustration of Alexander’s aims for at least two reasons:
(i) Sugden’s account is partially motivated by evolutionary game theory models used in
both economics and biology, and (ii) his ‘credible world’ terminology maps neatly onto
the justifications, goals, and inferences Alexander is drawing himself.
Models, Sugden (2000, 2009) argues are parallel worlds, artificially created, which
can be used to draw inductive inferences to the real world. At least he argues, such is
the practice in economics and biology. In both of these fields, phenomena are complex
and can be multiply realized by different mechanisms. This is why, Sugden argues, we
need induction to bridge the gap between the model world and the real world, even
though he grants that this may seem unappealing to some philosophers. A model here,
in virtue of its idealizations, is a sort of fictional entity that enables us to draw inductive
inferences about the real world via similarity relations to the ‘model world’. Hence,
Sugden argues, modelers aim to create ‘credible worlds’ that we could imagine being
real. It is not truth per se that is aimed for, but rather a sort of credibility that is deemed
able to tell us something about the real world we live in. To do so modelers, are
required to provide us with relevant similarities between what is happening in the
model and what could be going on in the real world, perhaps requiring a sort of
elaborative story or narrative linking the two. In the following, I argue that Alexander’s
contribution to the EMP consists in the construction of such ‘credible worlds’ from
which we can draw inductive or abductive inferences to the real world.19
19 I treat abduction, i.e. inference to the best explanation, here similar to Sugden (2009) as a form of
induction. Others do not share this view, instead arguing that eliminative induction is a form of IBE
e.g. Aydinonat (2007, 2008). However, I have no bone to pick in this debate. What conception one
holds does not impact the validity of the arguments presented here.
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Analyzing the phenomena cooperation, trust, fairness and retribution, Alexander
(2007) conducts his project by exploring different and increasingly complex models in
which he wants to explore the evolution of morality.20 He goes on to employ five
models, i.e. replicator dynamics, lattice models, small-world networks, bounded-degree
networks and dynamic networks each introducing more and more elaborate forms of
population structure back into the picture and increasing the realism of his models. He
analyses four different dimensions of morality, i.e. cooperation, trust, fairness and
retribution amounting to a set of twenty models, each having their robustness tested in
several iterations. Each of these models alone seems to tell us very little about the real
world. Taken together, however, this extensive set of robust models supports
Alexander’s assertion that population structure plays a very important role in the
evolution of morality.
First, he starts with a simple model used in evolutionary biology and increasingly the
social sciences, i.e. the replicator dynamics. As already alluded to, EGT allows for both
biological and cultural interpretations explaining the interdisciplinary interest in EGT.
While the biological form of these models treats replication as (biological) inheritance,
replication has to be interpreted as some form learning or imitation in a cultural setting.
Replicator dynamics (RD) are an attempt to model the relative changes of strategies in a
population. Again, these can be either instantiated biologically or culturally. Strategies
with higher fitness than the population average prosper and increase their share in the
population, while those with lower fitness are driven to extinction. RD in the biological
setting are thus an attempt to model the dynamics of reproduction and natural selection.
The following is the continuous replicator dynamics equation:
dxi
dt
¼ u i; xð Þ  u x; xð Þ½   xi ðWeibull; 1995; p: 72Þ ð1Þ
In each round individual strategies, i increase their share within a population linear to
their success u(i, x) compared to the average fitness u(x, x) in the population. Just as the
evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) familiar from earlier evolutionary game theory
models, RD assume infinite population size or at least infinite divisibility and random
interaction. These idealizations allow us to analyze the frequency-dependent success of
different strategies, whether they are biologically or culturally transmitted. Though he
intends his project to model the cultural evolution of morality, he grants that replicator
dynamics leave it open whether the strategies are genetically or culturally transmitted.
Let us consider Alexander’s first example and the most-analysed game in game theory:
the Prisoner’s Dilemma.
Table 1. The payoff matrix for the Prisoner’s Dilemma
Cooperate Defect
Cooperate (Lie Low) R S
Defect (Anticipate) T P
20 See Gelfert (2016) for a recent discussion of the various exploratory functions of models.
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In the Prisoner’s Dilemma, there is only one NE, i.e. Defect, Defect. This famous
game can be traced back to Hobbes (1651), who argued that a powerful leader is
required to escape the state of nature, i.e. collective defection. In fact, his name is
mentioned over twenty times in Alexander’s book, pointing to the long tradition of the
EMP. In Table 1, T is “temptation”, i.e. the value tempting defection, R is the “re-
ward” of joint cooperation, P is “punishment” as both receive a lower payoffs then they
would have gotten if both had cooperated, and S is the “sucker’s” payoff where a co-
operator is exploited (2007, p. 55). The payoffs are ordered as follows T > R > P > S
with the additional condition that T + S/2 is smaller than R. The ESS here coincides
with the strict Nash Equilibrium (NE)21 predicting mutual defection. Using replicator
dynamics to model the evolutionary trajectory shows that co-operators are quickly
driven to extinction, with defectors taking over the population.
As his book is called The Structural Evolution of Morality, Alexander is aware that
human societies are more complex and that we need to account for the social structure
of society in order make these models more credible. In fact, when population structure
is introduced, and interactions are no longer entirely random, making it possible for co-
operators to group together, cooperation can persist and evolve. Therefore he moves on
to explore agent-based models, i.e. lattice models, small-world networks, bounded-
degree networks and dynamic networks, where agents can choose with whom to
interact. Increasing the complexity in his models serves then two purposes: on the one
hand the goal is (i) to ensure robustness, i.e. the stability of the outcomes in the model
under changes in the model and on the other hand (ii) to increase the credibility of the
model, i.e. the likeliness of it telling us the true story about the evolution of morality.
As Sugden says: “what we need in addition is some confidence that the production
model is likely to do the job for which it has been designed – that it is likely to explain
real-world phenomena” (2000, p. 11), and this is Alexander’s stronger aim: the pre-
vision of a how actual explanation.22 Let me therefore, now tackle these two purposes
in succession.
Looking at robustness first, Alexander claims that the results in his models are
sufficiently robust to suggest that moral behavior can emerge and remain stable in a
population of boundedly rational agents. I agree with Kuorikiski and Lehtinen (2009)
that robustness analysis is somewhat implicit in Sugden’s account of inductive infer-
ence23, this, however, should be interpreted as a continuous inference from increasingly
similar model worlds to their real-world counterpart. Robustness analysis and inductive
inference are closely related and overlap in important respects, but Sugden is justified
21 The Nash Equilibrium introduced by John Nash, is the central, in fact, most important solution
concept in Game Theory. The concept picks out a combination of strategies, i.e. one for each
‘player’ in the game, in which none of the players has an incentive to unilaterally deviate from his
chosen strategy, while the strategies others have chosen remain fixed. In the Prisoner’s Dilemma
this classically leads to only one unique solution, i.e. mutual defection. Morality quickly suggests
itself as an evolved social solution to such inefficient equilibria.
22 I use how actual explanations in a modal sense, i.e. as a subset of how possibly explanations.
23 One may even treat robustness analysis as a necessary component of model-based science itself.
Sometimes it is used in a very narrow sense, at other times quite broadly. See Lisciandra (2017) for
a recent overview, but also Woodward (2006)
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in making a distinction on the grounds of their different epistemic properties.
Robustness analysis increases internal validity for the model world, while this internal
validity is a prerequisite for establishing external validity in the real world. When
slightly changed alterations of the model are seen as the target themselves, this dis-
tinction breaks down. I take Levy (2011) subtle criticism on the modeling literature on
the evolution of morality, to target the tendency of not sufficiently distinguishing
between these two distinct ways in which validity can be increased. Modelers such as
Skyrms, Levy argues, take their models to establish external validity, when really only
internal validity has been vindicated. I will say more about Levy’s criticism in the next
section on the empirical adequacy of these models.
When models are used to learn about human morality, Sugden (2009), Cartwright
(2009) and others are correct in arguing that the purpose of models is to learn some-
thing about a real-world target system. Francesco Guala, argues that it is “necessary to
investigate empirically which factors among those that may be causally relevant for the
result are likely to be instantiated in the real world but are absent from the experiment
(or vice versa)” (2005, p. 157). This procedure of establishing external validity not only
applies to inductive inference from the artificial experimental world to the real world
but also to inductive inference from the artificial model world to the real world. In both
cases, we want to draw inferences from highly idealized and abstract mechanisms to a
causal mechanism operating in the real world. As several authors have recently pointed
out, there are more important similarities than relevant differences between models and
experiments, which makes it difficult to justify drawing any hard boundaries between
the two.24
In order to gain confidence that Alexander’s ‘story’ provides us with the actual
explanation of human morality, requires more, especially evidence from psychology
and neuroscience, in order to learn about the causal mechanism behind moral behavior.
Even though our models are robust, this robustness in itself only tells us something
about the evolution of moral behavior in the model, i.e. unless relevant similarities
obtain between the real and the model world. Sugden argues that “a transition has to be
made from a particular hypothesis, which has been shown to be true in the model
world, to a general hypothesis, which we can expect to be true in the real world too”
(2000, p. 19), i.e. inductive inference. Sugden explicates three such inductive schemata,
explanation, prediction and abduction. For the purpose of this paper, only his expla-
nation schema is relevant:
E1 – in the model world, R is caused by F.
E2 – F operates in the real world.
E3 – R occurs in the real world.
Therefore, there is a reason to believe:
E4 – in the real world, R is caused by F. (2000, p. 12)
The phenomena R in question is the emergence and stability of moral behavior.
Though Alexander explicitly wants to explain more, i.e. the emergence and stability of
morality, we shall first consider whether these models can explain ‘moral’ behavior.
24 See Mäki (2005) and Parke (2014)
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What we need to establish in order to make justified inductive inferences, i.e.
extrapolation, from the model world to the real world are relevant similarities. While
the relevant set of causal factors in the model, i.e. cultural evolution, do operate in the
real world this may be an unavoidable feature of generalized theories. When Sugden
speaks of a model’s credibility he is not talking about their literal truth, but truth-
likeness, a description of “how the world could be” (2000, p. 24), a credible coun-
terfactual world. For a model world to achieve this kind of credibility, it needs to
cohere with the causal processes we know to be operating in the real world. The agents
postulated in our model need to be in a relevant sense like real agents in our world. By
using evolutionary game theory and bounded rationality models, Alexander intends to
trump the standard rational choice theory models in virtue of credibility. Drawing
inferences from his models, therefore, he argues is at least inductively more justified
than standard game theory explanations for the evolution of morality. This concession,
however, is unlikely to convince many critics of rational choice theory.
However, if standard rational choice models are justified, his models should be
justified by extension in virtue of their enhanced credibility. If the standard models fail
to achieve credibility or rather external validity, we need some further argument, to see
how Alexander’s models are explanatory. When Alexander moves from the simple
replicator dynamics to lattice models, he is continuing his quest for a more credible
model world. Here we drop the unrealistic assumption of random interaction in an
infinitely sized population for a one-dimensional lattice in which everyone has two
neighbors to interact with. Secondly, Alexander analyzes how different learning rules
change the strategy dynamics in his models, all of which are rather simple but perhaps
better capture the actual strategy changes in human agents. As the assumption of only
interacting with two neighbors is highly unrealistic in itself, Alexander moves to small-
world networks where some agents have an additional interaction possibility by being
connected over a bridge. Further increasing credibility, Alexander moves to bounded-
degree networks where every agent has a certain number of connections i between k
(min) and k(max). Here connections need not be neighbors and are randomly assigned,
creating networks that look fairly similar to interaction networks in the real world.
However, humans obviously do not choose with whom to interact entirely at random.
When we encounter someone who cheats in a cooperative endeavor we will try to avoid
them and interact with someone else next time. Alexander draws on Skyrms and
Pemantle (2000) model of social network formation in order to model changing
interaction frequencies. Without going into the specifics and intricacies of each of these
models, they illustrate an important point: Alexander’s book follows the modeling
strategy of first ensuring robustness and internal validity, before moving on to more
credible model worlds that gain complexity and inferential power. The latter approach
must, of course, be closely related to empirical research into morality, most impor-
tantly, perhaps moral psychology.
Robert Sugden’s account of modeling is justified in virtue of being a naturalistic,
pragmatic account of the actual scientific modeling practice. Models are successful in
explaining but do so by induction. Therefore, we should accept induction as a valid
principle in the modelers toolkit, “however problematic [that] may be for professional
logicians” (2009, p. 19). In a research paper on the evolutionary turn in game theory,
Sugden writes:
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Evolutionary game theory is still in its infancy. A genuinely evolutionary approach to economic
explanation has an enormous amount to offer; biology really is a much better role model for
economics than is physics. I just hope that economists will come to see the need to emulate the
empirical research methods of biology and not just its mathematical techniques. (2001, p. 128)
Alexander doesn’t fall into this trap, for he only sees his mathematical models as a
subset of the necessary steps towards a genuine explanation for the evolution of
morality. This is where empirical evidence needs to be accumulated, and studies
conducted, analyzing development psychology with respect to social norms. Alexan-
der’s work, however, guides the way for such empirical research and theory testing to
commence, in a field that is still nebulous and wide. How to move from robust EGT
models to the real world will be explored in the next section.
3 Empirical Adequacy
The most sophisticated criticism of attempts to model the evolution of morality has
recently been offered by Levy (2011). Rather than denying the importance of models,
Levy argues that there are two distinct modes of inquiry in which indirect modeling can
be used to study otherwise complex phenomena. Levy argues that the work of Skyrms,
Alexander, and others is characterized by ‘internal’ progress, achieved within the
model, rather than ‘target-oriented’ progress where we learn more directly about the
target system itself. While Levy does not go as far as to argue that this strategy is pure
conceptual exploration25, he suggests that it is “more conceptual in spirit” aimed at
understanding the initial model itself (2011, p. 186). Target-oriented modeling, Levy
argues, progresses by “incrementally adding causal information” primarily guided by
considerations of empirical adequacy (p. 186). In contrast, models for the evolution of
morality explore the “subtleties of a constructed set-up” with empirical adequacy only
playing a minor role (p. 186).
Similarly, Sugden suggests that a “model cannot prove useful unless someone uses
it, and whoever that person is, he or she will have to bridge the gap between model
world and real world” (2009, p. 26). Though Alexander downplays the role of his
models by saying that they alone cannot account for much, he suggests that jointly with
theories of bounded rationality and research in psychology and economics we can get
closer to the actual explanation of how morality evolved. This is the main motivation
behind Sugden’s (2000, 2009) credible world account of modeling. If models were
only about conceptual exploration and providing theorems, any mention of the real
world and the relationship of the model to it would be nothing but telling a story to sell
one’s model. Levy (2011) suggests that this is what might be happening in the models
provided by Skyrms and Alexander. However, as I shall argue, their modeling strategy
of the evolution of moral norms explicitly acknowledges relevant real world factors and
successively tries to increase the credibility of his models. In the following, I shall
argue that EGT models can inform empirical research and vice-versa.
25 See Hausman (1992).
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Rosenberg and Linquist (2005) wrote a paper on evolutionary game theory models
for cooperation and how to test them empirically, which will prove highly useful for
this section. They argue that we can use archaeology, anthropology, primatology and
even gene-sequencing to support EGT models. Supporting Alexander, they argue that
human cooperation is too sophisticated, conditionalized and domain-general for it to be
a genetically hardwired trait. What Alexander does not consider is potential gene-
culture co-evolution. But I take him to make a deliberately weaker claim, that even if it
turns out that human morality is entirely cultural, his models will be useful. If we find
empirical evidence for ‘hard-wired’ behavior than all the better for an evolutionary
explanation of morality. However, in order to have a credible EGT model Rosenberg
and Linquist argue already requires a lot of substantial assumptions, for example,
emotion, reliable memories, a theory of (other) mind(s), language and imitation
learning. Experiments in economics and psychology, often done in the form of games,
can inform us about how humans act, and how a change in conditions changes human
behavior. Such empirical work can then help the modeler to not only increase the
credibility of his models but also to eliminate those models would tell a completely
misguided story of the evolution of (human) morality.26
Rosenberg and Linquist provide the popular example of the big-game hunt
hypothesis as an explanation for why humans started cooperating. They point out that
the empirical data suggests that big-game hunter was an inferior strategy in comparison
to gathering, not even granting the payoffs specified in a stag-hunt game. Though the
big-game hunt hypothesis tells a nice story of why humans started to cooperate, we
should treat it as even less than a ‘just so story’ because the evidence suggests that it is
most likely false. As an alternative, they propose cooperative child-caring which
interestingly also fits the mathematical description of a stag-hunt game. In light of
empirical evidence, they argue that modelers should try to alter their stag-hunt models
for trust by thinking about the potential payoffs of cooperative child-care rather than the
payoffs of cooperative hunting.
Such is the nature of this enterprise: both modeling and empirical research can
inform each other in a variety of ways. Though many models will be discarded, this
leaves us with a much narrower set of how possible explanations and gets us closer to
the actual one. They close their paper by stating that is “not for philosophers to
speculate how this research once commenced will eventuate” (p. 156), but it is nev-
ertheless necessary to bring in line the theoretical work done in evolutionary game
theory with the empirical data from various field.27 Otherwise, EGT models are
nothing but conceptual exploration, and as Sugden points out, modelers should and can
aim for more. Nevertheless, Hegselmann (2009) suggests caution against the hope that
the “huge gap between macroscopic models of moral dynamics and the known variety
of microscopic processes that seem to generate certain assumed overall effects”
(p. 5689) can be bridged in the near future, if at all. Criticism directed against
26 As Zollman (2009) points out in his review of Arnold 2008, models have directly inspired
experimental work on the evolution of morality, e.g. Wedekind and Milinki (2000); Seinen and
Schram (2006).
27 Similar arguments have recently been raised against the use of game theoretic tools to explain the
evolution of multicellularity. See Veit (2019a).
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Alexander, stating that he failed to provide a complete explanation is not nearly as
effective when a complete explanation is not reachable anyway. While we might
consider Alexander’s work as only one of the first steps in getting closer to a complete
explanation of human morality, it remains an important step nonetheless. Though the
empirical data is weak, or rather because of it, it is so important to combine the research
results from different fields. Models, far from being a mere add-on to this research
program, appear to be a necessary and integral part of the EMP, transforming it more
and more into a science in its own right. Let me now conclude this discussion with the
controversial debate whether such models have any impact on the moral status of
morality.
4 Implications for the Moral Status of Morality
Alexander concludes that “evolutionary game theory, coupled with the theory of
bounded rationality and recent experimental work bridging the gap between psychol-
ogy and economics, provides what appears to be a radical restructuring of the foun-
dations of moral theory” showing that the content of “moral theories are real and
binding” (2007, p. 291), though their content is highly dependent on us and the
structure of society. Alexander (2007), rather than providing an evolutionary
debunking argument for morality, claims to provide an ‘objective but relative’ basis for
morality in so far as he shows that the principles of morality are in the best long-term
interest of everyone, a claim that may seem just as radical. This distinction is important
as it is often treated anonymously; however, as I shall argue, Alexander goes one step
too far when he treats the instrumental justification of morality as an epistemic
justification.28
Due to the importance of population structure illustrated in his book, Alexander
argues morality is necessarily relative to the structure of society. Morality, he argues, is
objective but relative. This is an ambitious suggestion, standing in stark contrast to the
careful conclusions Alexander has drawn in the rest of his book, and hence deserves
closer inspection. Unlike Joyce (2001, 2006); Street (2006) and Sommers and
Rosenberg (2003; Rosenberg 2011), who provide evolutionary debunking arguments
for the objectivity of morality, Alexander argues that his models, rather than under-
mining, are able to vindicate morality. And in doing so, he draws explicitly on Hume:
[M]uch work has to be undertaken in order to unpack Hume’s “certain proposition” that “[T] is
only from the selfishness and confin’d generosity of men, along with the scanty provision nature
has made for his wants, that justice derives its origin.”[29] And, as for the origin of justice, so for
the rest of morality. (2007, p. 291).
For Humeans in the tradition of Williams (1981) and arguably Hume himself,
notions of objectivity were always somewhat odd. In fact, all of the three evolutionary
debunkers mentioned above, see themselves as Humeans. They argue that in light of an
28 I thank Richard Joyce for suggesting this formulation to me.
29 A Treatise of Human Nature, Book III, part II, section II.
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evolutionary explanation for the adaptiveness of moral attitudes and behavior, there is
neither a need nor should we endorse any ‘magical’ property that makes morality
somehow objective. Nevertheless, Joyce (2001) in his book The myth of morality
explores the possibility of vindicating the objectivity of morality by linking it to
rationality, as perhaps the strongest candidate view to avoid the conclusions of the error
theorist (see Mackie 1977). Alexander’s argument for the vindication of morality rests
on the same motivation: if it can be shown that it is in everyone’s interest to act
according to morality, morality can be saved.
For this approach to be successful, Joyce (2001) argues we would need to arrive at
some sort of categorical imperative that derives from rationality alone, i.e. precisely the
route Kant took to save the status of morality from Hume’s philosophy. For Humeans,
who see reasons as relative to desires, aims and preferences (perhaps also beliefs), this
approach must be futile. The moral heuristics will not only be relative to the structure
of the society we live in, but also relative to the aims and desires we have, and hence
subjective. They would be nothing more than mere heuristics that apply to the majority
of the population in the majority of circumstances. Alexander does not see this as a
problem; in fact, he sees it as sufficient for grounding morality as something objective,
but nevertheless relative.30
However, as I see it the previously provided arguments are sufficient for casting
doubt on the project of vindicating the objectivity of morality by pointing to a highly
relativistic notion of rationality crucially depending on the social structure of society.31
For even if we grant that this is a sort of objectivity, it is not what humans refer to when
talking about the objectivity of morality, nor is it what metaethicists are usually
interested in. Error theorists like Mackie, Joyce and Rosenberg readily accept the
debunking. Alexander, however, prefers a more subtle version of what we could mean
by moral objectivity. His work captures something important: the advice we give our
children, the moral norms we teach are likely to be in their long-term best interest. They
are useful heuristics that evolved to reap the benefits of cooperation in strategic
interaction problems, and as Alexander points out, they are highly contingent on the
social structure of society. Levy (2018) suggests that the models explored in the EMP
could provide us with insights into the desirability of certain institutions and societal
norms, merely in virtue of their stability. For meta-ethics, however, the impact of the
EMP may be severe. Akin to an electromagnetic pulse (EMP) the Explaining Morality
Program could paralyze much of the traditional work of philosophers working on
morality.32 Hence, it comes with no surprise that many naturalists and philosophers of
30 Joyce (2001, 2006) explores these issues in more detail than I can do justice here.
31 Sterelny and Fraser (2016) offer a defence of such a weaker form of moral realism. I will note that I
do not find such approaches plausible, as they commonly rest on a re-definition of what is
traditionally understood as moral realism.
32 This, however, is a matter for another paper. Nagel (2012) recognizes this threat but turns the modus
ponens into a modus tollens even going so far as to argue that since moral realism is true the
Darwinian story of how morality evolved must be false. This gets things backwards. See Garner
(2007) for radical conclusions regarding the elimination of morality, or for nihilism more generally,
see Sommers and Rosenberg (2003) and Veit (2019b). A collected volume on the question whether
morality should be abolished has recently been published by Garner and Joyce (2019).
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science seem to hold a deflated sense of moral objectivity or become error theorists,
such as Mackie.
Much more empirical work needs to be done, but the long path to explaining
morality is at least partly illuminated by the work of modelers such as Skyrms,
Alexander, and others. Clearly, this can only be the beginning of an explanation, but
the first steps have been taken. Replicator dynamics have limits and often need to be
supplanted with other models, e.g. non-EGT models for inheritance and cognitive
mechanisms, to provide satisfying explanations of real-world phenomena. A diverse set
of multiple models among which as Hegselmann (2009) argues bridges can be built
may be the best thing we can hope for, but these as I have argued are importantly not
without considerable explanatory power. See also Veit (forthcoming) for a thorough
defense of using multiple models, a position I dub ‘Model Pluralism’. To conclude, it is
just the faulty ideal of a complete explanation that blocks such incremental steps
towards a better understanding of complex phenomena such as human morality.
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